Anticompetitive Effects of the Banking Cartel in Turkish Loan Market

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ÇELEN A.

Sosyoekonomi, cilt.27, sa.40, ss.211-227, 2019 (Hakemli Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 27 Sayı: 40
  • Basım Tarihi: 2019
  • Dergi Adı: Sosyoekonomi
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM)
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.211-227
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Cartel, Competition, Turkish Banking, Bresnahan-Lau Model
  • İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of the banking cartel on the competition in theTurkish loan market. In doing this, we use Bresnahan-Lau model with alternative supply relationdefinitions. Our results suggest that Turkish banks operate in the perfectly competitive conditionsduring the non-cartel period. However, with the enforcement of the cartel actively between September2007 and September 2011, the competition intensity in the market was damaged significantly. Allalternative models witness the robust conclusion that the banking cartel affected the competition in theloan market adversely.