Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
The Conference of Turkish Economic Association TEA2024, Muğla, Türkiye, 31 Ekim - 02 Kasım 2024, ss.204, (Özet Bildiri)
Is it socially optimal to tax robots? Despite its significance, this well-known normative debate cannot address whether voters with conflicting interests would actually support such policies. To bridge this gap, we develop a general equilibrium model where robots displace routine workers but enhance the productivity of non-routine workers. The decision to tax or subsidize robots is determined through elections, with two rival parties each representing one of these worker groups. After proving the existence of equilibrium, we analytically show that when robot prices are low, both parties support taxing automation, though at different rates. Conversely, high prices lead to subsidies. Our calibrations indicate that, due to the currently high cost of robots, the political equilibrium favors automation subsidies. Therefore, we argue that robot taxes are politically unviable under current conditions, although this could change if robot prices decrease in the future.