Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Tez Türü: Doktora
Tezin Yürütüldüğü Kurum: Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İktisat, Türkiye
Tez Danışmanı: Burak Ünveren
Tezin Onay Tarihi: 2025
Tezin Dili: İngilizce
Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
Desteklendiği Program: Bu tezi destekleyen bir program bulunmamaktadır
Özet:
This thesis is structured as a three-essay format. The first essay investigates whether political competition leads to the taxation or subsidization of robots in a general equilibrium setup. Our primary assumption is that while automation substitutes for routine labor, it enhances the productivity of non-routine labor, thereby creating a political conflict of interest within society. This conflict gives rise to electoral competition between two political parties, each representing different labor groups, and engaging in a game-theoretic rivalry to win elections and maximize the expected welfare of their electorates. In this political competition framework known as the Wittman model, both income tax and a robot tax serve as policy instruments. Our theoretical and quantitative analyses demonstrate that, given the currently high cost of robots, both parties support subsidies for robot usage. However, as technological progress drives down robot prices over time, the model suggests that robot tax may become inevitable in the long run. The second essay examines how the robot tax is endogenously determined in an overlapping generations (OLG) model featuring young routine and non-routine workers, as well as old routine and non-routine retirees. By incorporating generational differences and accounting for both income and wealth inequality, the model analyzes how two political parties—each representing distinct groups—maximize the expected indirect utility of their electorates under Wittman political competition. The party representing young and old non-routine individuals favors a moderate robot subsidy in the steady state, while the party representing routine workers proposes a high robot tax. Compared to the laissez-faire and social planner solutions, the analysis reveals that there are probabilistic shifts in election outcomes that alter the levels of income and wealth inequality, reminiscent of political business cycles. The third essay explores whether redistribution can be a driver of automation. Using a general equilibrium model with automation, both analytical and numerical results show that redistribution increases the level of automation. This theoretical insight is supported by an empirical analysis based on panel data. Applying the GMM-IV estimation method, the study finds that redistribution has a statistically significant and positive causal effect on automation.